The Gentlemen — Ransomware Group Profile
TLP:CLEAR | 2026-10-05 | Monadnock Cyber LLC
Executive summary
The Gentlemen is a ransomware-as-a-service operation that emerged in September 2025. It runs double extortion — it encrypts files and threatens to leak stolen data. It works across many sectors and countries, using compromised VPN credentials, kernel-level driver abuse, and common administrative tools to get in, move laterally, and encrypt. We hold high confidence in the methods below.
Targeting
- Geography: United States (18 listed victims), Brazil (6), United Kingdom (4), India (4). Other listed victims include a Spanish hospital and a Korean safety-systems firm.
- Sectors: manufacturing, construction, healthcare, insurance, engineering, and industrial.
- Selection: broad targeting weighted toward internet-facing infrastructure and remote access, rather than sector-specific espionage. Leak-site listings are claims, not confirmed breaches.
Attacker methods
Initial access
- Brute-forced VPN credentials (operators held 969 validated FortiGate VPN logins)
- Exposed remote-access gateways
- Targeted products: FortiGate, SonicWall VPN, Cisco ASA appliances, Oracle E-Business Suite
Reconnaissance
- Advanced IP Scanner to map the network and find high-value systems
Defense evasion
- Bring-Your-Own-Vulnerable-Driver: All.exe paired with the ThrottleBlood.sys driver to kill EDR/antivirus at the kernel
- Disabling Windows Defender
- Deleting Volume Shadow Copies
Lateral movement
- PsExec over SMB admin shares, blended into normal administrative traffic
Exfiltration & persistence
- WinSCP over encrypted channels for data theft
- Persistence through AnyDesk and modified registry keys
Encryptor
- Supports Windows, Linux, and ESXi
- Windows variant written in Go; requires a password argument to run
- Appends .7mtzhh; drops README-GENTLEMEN.txt
In plain terms — what the attacker is doing
- Initial access: The attacker guesses or steals login codes for your public websites and email systems to get inside.
- Reconnaissance: The attacker scans your entire office network to locate your most important data storage systems.
- Defense evasion: The attacker turns off your protection programs and erases system recovery options so they cannot be stopped easily.
- Lateral movement: The attacker moves silently through your connected devices to reach every part of your business network.
- Exfiltration & persistence: The attacker copies your private files to external computers and installs hidden access tools for future entry.
- Encryptor: The attacker locks all your business computers and leaves a demand for payment to unlock them.
How to protect
| Control area | Recommendation |
|---|---|
| Perimeter & remote access | Harden and patch all internet-facing VPNs and gateways (FortiGate, SonicWall, Cisco ASA, Oracle E-Business Suite). Enforce phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication on every remote-access path. |
| Endpoint protection | Block and monitor vulnerable-driver loading. Enforce tamper protection on EDR/antivirus to defeat the kernel-driver technique. |
| Network monitoring | Alert on PsExec and SMB admin-share use outside known maintenance windows. |
| Remote tools & transfer | Alert on remote-access and file-transfer tools (AnyDesk, WinSCP) in environments that do not use them. |
| Backup & recovery | Keep offline or immutable backups; guard Volume Shadow Copies from deletion. |
What this means for you
- Perimeter & remote access: Update your login gateways regularly and require a second sign-in step for every remote connection.
- Endpoint protection: Stop unauthorized software from installing on your computers and keep your security software switched on at all times.
- Network monitoring: Watch for remote administration tools running on your network outside normal working hours.
- Remote tools & transfer: Treat unexpected remote-control or file-sharing software as a warning sign and check it out.
- Backup & recovery: Store copies of your data in a separate place that attackers cannot change, and test that you can restore them.
Confidence & gaps
We assess with high confidence that the methods above are accurate — they are corroborated across three primary-vendor reports and consistent with known ransomware-as-a-service patterns. Gaps: the full extent of targeting beyond listed victims, and the group's specific motivation, remain unconfirmed.
Sources
| Source | Reliability | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Trend Micro — Unmasking The Gentlemen | Vendor CTI, high | Method analysis |
| Huntress — defense-evasion analysis | Vendor CTI, high | Kernel-driver (BYOVD) detail |
| Group-IB — Hastalamuerte / Gentlemen | Vendor CTI, high | Service-model methods |
| COBALT ransomware_victims | Leak-site listings, moderate | Victimology (claims, not confirmed breaches) |
| MITRE ATT&CK | A-2 | Technique attribution (capability, not victim proof) |
Handling & method
Prepared from open-source and licensed collection only; no personally identifiable information retained. Collection and analysis run locally on Monadnock infrastructure. Graded to ICD-203 and cross-checked across local models before release.
Draft authored on qwen3.6 (structure) and verified/edited to the Monadnock standard; pending the three-model rigor panel.

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