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Block Lists Know the Criminal Hosts. The Password Hunters Came From the Cloud.

Monadnock Cyber

TLP:CLEAR · MONADNOCK CYBER WHITE PAPER

12 November 2026 · Companion to Ask for a Certificate, and the Scanners Show Up in Under a Minute

When a company sets up a new web server and gets a security certificate for it, the server's name goes into a public log. Automated scanners read that log and arrive within a minute, hunting for files that hold passwords and keys. Monadnock Cyber set a trap to watch them arrive. This paper asks the next question: who are they?

Our answer: threat intelligence names the networks the scanners run on, not the people who run them. A small share of the scanning came from networks that a leading anti-abuse group already lists as criminal. Most of the password hunting came from ordinary rented machines on Google's and Amazon's clouds, and no block list flagged them. A company that relies on block lists stops the smaller threat and lets the larger one through.

Certificates put server names in a public log

A certificate is what lets a browser show the padlock and encrypt traffic to a website. Browsers require every publicly trusted certificate to be recorded in public Certificate Transparency logs, so that a wrongly issued certificate gets caught. The logs are open to anyone, including attackers. When a company requests a certificate for a new server, the server's name becomes public at that moment, whether or not the server is ready.

Our test

On 25 October 2026 Monadnock Cyber requested a certificate for a server name we had never published, linked or shared. No real server sat behind the name. The certificate was the only public record of it.

  • How fast: scanners arrived in the same minute the certificate was issued.
  • How much: over the next 15 days the trap drew 4,177 requests from 415 internet addresses on 105 networks.
  • What they wanted: 2,035 of those requests asked for files that hold passwords, keys or server settings: files such as /.env (application passwords), /.git/config (source-code repository settings) and /.aws/credentials (cloud account keys). E2

Our companion paper, Ask for a Certificate, and the Scanners Show Up in Under a Minute, reports the test in full.

Block lists and threat intelligence

Security groups publish lists of internet addresses caught attacking others, for companies to block. This paper uses four:

  • Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer"): published by Spamhaus, a long-running anti-abuse organization. It lists whole network ranges that Spamhaus judges are run by criminals or hijacked from their owners.
  • blocklist.de and CI Army: community lists of single addresses reported for attacks.
  • Binary Defense: a security company's list of addresses it bans.

Monadnock Cyber also collects news, threat reporting and reports shared by partner organizations.

Networks are not people

Every internet address belongs to a network, and every network carries a registry number, written like AS48090. The network's name tells you which company runs the machines, not who rented them. Cloud providers such as Google and Amazon rent machines to anyone with a payment card. Some smaller hosting companies sell to criminals on purpose and promise to ignore complaints; the industry calls that "bulletproof hosting." Naming the person behind a scan takes the provider's customer records, which only the provider and the police see.

The question

Does any of the trap's traffic match known threat intelligence, and does that intelligence say who sent it?

How we checked

  • Every address against our holdings. We checked all 415 trap addresses against the four block lists, against our reputation and indicator feeds, and against partner reports. E1
  • Our own sensors. We looked for the same addresses elsewhere in our sensor data. E3
  • Our reporting. For every network that matched, we searched the news and threat reporting we collect for the network's name. E1, E4, E5, E6

What we found

Key findings

  • No source names a person or group behind any request.
  • 91 of the 415 addresses sit on at least one block list. None of those lists says who controls the address. E1
  • Nine of the networks sit on Spamhaus DROP, Spamhaus's list of criminal or hijacked networks. They sent 301 of the 4,177 requests and 154 of the 2,035 password and key requests. E1, E2
  • Public reporting ties three of the nine to criminal hosting. E4, E5, E6
  • Most of the password hunting came from the big clouds. Google Cloud and Amazon addresses sent 1,752 of the 2,035 password and key requests. Only one of those requests came from an address on any block list. E1, E2

Judgment. We judge it likely that a small share of the trap traffic came from criminal-run hosting.

Confidence: moderate. For three networks, two independent sources support the judgment: Spamhaus, and separate public reporting. For the other six, it rests on Spamhaus alone.

The block lists

  • 91 trap addresses appear on blocklist.de (72), CI Army (31), Spamhaus DROP (27) and Binary Defense (17). Some appear on more than one. E1
  • blocklist.de and CI Army both build their lists from attack reports, so we count them as one line of evidence, not two.
  • No trap address matched any known campaign in the feeds and partner reports we hold. E1

The nine networks Spamhaus lists

The table covers all trap traffic from the nine networks: 30 addresses, 27 of them inside network ranges Spamhaus lists. E1, E2

Network (registry number) Listed / trap addresses Trap requests Password and key requests What public reporting says
TECHOFF SRV (AS48090) 7 / 7 204 124 Nothing we hold
TC DATACENTER (AS218785) 5 / 6 56 18 Nothing we hold
Omegatech (AS202412) 3 / 3 13 0 Omegatech is a trade name of Virtualine, a bulletproof hosting service whose website the FBI seized
TechTies (AS197170) 3 / 5 7 4 A partner report ties a crypto-mining and proxy crew to servers rented here
UNMANAGED LTD 4 / 4 4 3 Nothing we hold
Blatant Technologies 1 / 1 10 4 Nothing we hold
1337 Services (AS210558) 2 / 2 3 0 Huntress traced a Microsoft 365 break-in campaign to its servers
Feo Prest 1 / 1 1 0 Nothing we hold
49.3 Networking 1 / 1 3 1 Nothing we hold
Total 27 / 30 301 154

What the two largest networks sent:

  • TECHOFF SRV sent the most. 124 of its 204 requests asked for password and key files: /.env, /.env.production, /.aws/credentials and /.git/config. E2
  • TC DATACENTER asked for source-code repository files: /.git, /.hg and /.svn. E2

Neither network appears in any reporting we hold.

The three networks with public reporting

Omegatech (AS202412)

What the record shows:

  • The FBI seized virtualine.net in October 2026. Court documents name Omegatech as one of Virtualine's trade names. E4
  • Virtualine sold hosting that promised to ignore abuse complaints and police requests. It advertised that hosting for phishing, spam, card fraud and scanning other people's networks. E4
  • Four news outlets reported the seizure. All four cite the same Justice Department court documents, so we count them as one source.
  • At the trap, three Omegatech addresses sent 13 requests on 25 and 26 October, before the seizure became public. None asked for password or key files. E2

Our judgment:

  • We judge it likely that the Omegatech network at the trap is Virtualine's.
  • Confidence is low: the link rests on a shared name. We have not tied the network's registry record to Virtualine.
  • Alternative: an unrelated company carries the same name. The Spamhaus listing makes that less likely; it does not rule it out.

1337 Services GmbH (AS210558)

What the record shows:

  • Huntress, a security company, tracked a campaign that broke into Microsoft 365 accounts at 79 organizations by replaying stolen sign-in sessions. It ran from 14 July to 22 September 2026, from 1337 Services servers. E5
  • The Hacker News reports that the provider rents servers to the public through StarkRDP and rdp.sh. E5
  • At the trap, two addresses sent three routine requests, for the home page and /license.txt. E2

Our judgment: We judge it very unlikely that the trap traffic and the Huntress campaign share an operator. The provider rents to anyone, and the trap requests show nothing of that campaign.

TechTies (AS197170)

What the record shows:

  • A partner report released for public sharing records a scanner on TechTies, rented through the kittyrdp service. It ties the scanner to a crew that mines cryptocurrency and resells proxy access. The partner declined to attribute the scanner itself. E6
  • That scanner's address does not appear at the trap.
  • Five TechTies addresses sent seven requests, for /.git/config, /.git/HEAD and a WordPress plugin file. E2

Our judgment: We hold no link between the trap traffic and that crew.

A first-minute scanner named for the certificate logs

What the record shows:

  • In the minute the certificate was issued (15:53 UTC, 25 October), six addresses sent 10 requests. E2
  • One address on TC DATACENTER sent two of them.
    • It called itself "CT-WP-Scanner/1.0" and gave a placeholder web link (https://example.com/bot).
    • Spamhaus lists five of TC DATACENTER's six trap addresses; this address is not one of the five. E1
    • The same address also probed other sites we monitor in early November. E3
  • The other first-minute visitors asked only for the home page or its icon:
    • a crawler that named itself, ForestEngine, on DigitalOcean;
    • unlabeled traffic from Hetzner, Oracle and Google.

Our judgment:

  • We judge it likely that "CT" stands for Certificate Transparency and "WP" for WordPress, and that the tool watches the certificate logs for new WordPress sites.
  • That is our inference from the name alone; the scanner did not say so. Confidence is low: one line of evidence, and a label anyone types.
  • It is the only first-minute visitor whose own label points at the certificate logs, and it ran on a network Spamhaus lists.

The heaviest password hunting carries no attribution

  • The cloud senders: Google Cloud addresses sent 1,485 password and key requests, and Amazon addresses sent 267. E2
  • Block-list coverage: none of those addresses sits on Spamhaus DROP. One Google Cloud request came from an address on another block list; no Amazon request did. E1
  • Who they are: customers of the cloud providers. Only the providers' records tie an address to the customer who rented it.

What it means for you

  • Two kinds of sender, two answers to "who did this?"
    • On Google Cloud, Amazon and DigitalOcean, a customer of the cloud provider ran the scan.
    • On the nine listed networks, Spamhaus judges the network itself criminal or hijacked.
  • Block lists stop the smaller threat.
    • The listed networks sent 154 password and key requests.
    • Clean cloud addresses sent more than 1,700.
    • A company relying on block lists alone would have stopped most of the first group and let the second through.
  • Naming the operator takes records defenders rarely hold: the provider's customer records, or a match to a known campaign's tools or infrastructure.

What to do

  1. Lock the server down before you request its certificate. The name goes public the moment you do.
  2. Block requests for password and key files at the edge, whatever the sender's reputation: /.env*, /.git/, /.aws/, /.kube/config, /.docker/config.json, /.vscode/sftp.json, /actuator/env.
  3. Treat a clean address on a major cloud as unvetted, not trusted. In this test, clean cloud addresses did most of the password hunting.
  4. Use Spamhaus DROP as a floor. It costs nothing, and in this test it covered 27 of the 30 addresses on the nine listed networks.
  5. Report abuse to the cloud provider. The provider holds the only record that names the customer.

What this check does and does not show

  • It shows which trap traffic came from networks that public block lists and reporting already flag.
  • It does not show who ran any scan. No source we hold names a person or group.
  • It covers what we hold. We ran no registry lookups and used no commercial reputation services.
  • The trap recorded requests, not payloads. No malware or tooling ties any request to a known campaign.
  • It rests on one trap over 15 days. It demonstrates a pattern; it does not measure an internet-wide rate.
  • Our count of password and key requests includes 35 requests for server-status and diagnostic pages (/phpinfo.php, /server-status and similar). Those expose server settings rather than credentials.

Evidence

ID What Source Reliability
E1 Trap addresses matched against threat intelligence held by Monadnock Cyber, 12 November 2026 Spamhaus DROP; blocklist.de; CI Army; Binary Defense; reputation and indicator feeds; partner reports Spamhaus: high. Community block lists: moderate.
E2 Trap request log, 25 October – 8 November 2026: 4,177 requests from 415 addresses Cloudflare edge logs of Monadnock Cyber's own test zone; full results in Ask for a Certificate, and the Scanners Show Up in Under a Minute High
E3 The same addresses elsewhere in our sensor data Monadnock Cyber sensors High. Reported as a pattern only.
E4 FBI seizure of virtualine.net; Omegatech named as a trade name The Hacker News, BleepingComputer, The Record and SecurityWeek, all citing Justice Department court documents, October 2026 Moderate. One underlying source.
E5 Microsoft 365 session-replay campaign traced to 1337 Services servers Huntress, reported by Help Net Security (23 October 2026) and The Hacker News (October 2026) Moderate
E6 TechTies scanner tied to a crypto-mining and proxy crew Partner report, released for public sharing, 7 November 2026 Moderate. The partner declined to attribute the scanner.

TLP:CLEAR · MCL-PUB-2026-1112-02 · © 2026 Monadnock Cyber, LLC. All rights reserved.

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