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Monadnock Cyber --Data Mining for Cyber Security and Real Estate

Monadnock Cyber
A breach notice names a company. A leak site names a victim. A county record names a parcel. Each one looks like a fact.

Pair the wrong name with the wrong domain, or the wrong owner with the wrong house, and you get a careful report about the wrong thing. Most data is noise until someone checks it. Checking? It is the job.

I mine public and collected data, check it, grade it, and turn it into judgments you can act on. I mine cyber security because it’s what I know. I mine real estate because there was a ton of data available while I was learning. Now I do both. Same method, different questions.

How I work

If you've worked for me you've heard me say this many times...

"Just the facts ma'am." 

  • Every fact is sourced.
  • We count independent sources, not hits. Twenty records from one feed is one source.
  • Say how likely something is in standard words. Then say, separately, how confident I am and why.
  • Never assert an identity I have not verified.
  • When the evidence runs out, say so.

Intelligence-based information security

I run information security the way I run intelligence: know who would come after you and how, grade the evidence, then build the practice and processes around what the evidence supports. Controls follow the threat, not a checklist.

As a virtual CISO on retainer, I design, deploy and advise. You get a security program built on the same tradecraft as everything else in this piece.

Cyber security: who is exposed, and the proof

SIGNAL: sales intelligence for security providers. SIGNAL finds mid-market US organizations with demonstrated exposure: a breach notice filed with a state regulator, a listing on a ransomware leak site, a flaw attackers are known to be exploiting. It then assembles the evidence a managed security provider needs to open a credible conversation. I verify each organization’s identity before a customer sees it. A record that does not resolve cleanly stays in my working book, not in the customer’s hands. Nothing ships without a release review.

Am I a Target?: risk assessment for one organization. Name a company. You get a graded answer: who would want to attack it, how, and on what evidence. The full report adds the sources and the method behind every finding.

Published intelligence. On the Monadnock Cyber blog, the Daily Cyber Brief covers what changed this week in ransomware leak-site listings, state breach filings and exploited flaws. Above the Fold reports what each monitored country’s own press tells its own people about cyber and AI, read in the original language.

Where the data comes from. I draw on:

  • state attorney-general breach registers;
  • CISA’s catalog of known-exploited vulnerabilities;
  • ransomware leak sites and underground markets;
  • national press and government cyber agencies, in their own languages;
  • MITRE ATT&CK;
  • my own internet-facing sensors.

Every source carries a reliability grade and a sharing designation before it touches an assessment. The analysis runs on my own hardware, not on a third-party AI service.

Real estate: Property, land and the people who move

The real estate practice runs the same method against more than houses. The target changes: a home, a parcel, an executive. The method doesn’t. It is the same tradecraft I use to track digital information for cyber threats to organizations.

Site intelligence for developers. Developers who want to buy property need to find the parcels that fit before a competitor does. I mine public records to find them and grade them. I demonstrated it to solar developers on November 3rd.

Executive movement, as lead generation for REALTORS®. I track public information on where executives are moving. An executive who changes jobs or cities is often about to buy or sell a home. That is a lead, delivered before the listing exists.

Market reads. Pricing reality, days-on-market pressure, what is moving and why. Written for the side of the table that usually knows less.

I build  reports on the seller’s own house: flood zone, terrain, history. Often things a fifteen-year owner never knew.

One method, two markets

A family relocating to New Hampshire needs a house. In the first month after closing, it also needs a secured home network and cameras. I built a home-network monitoring service and a cameras-and-alarms offering for that month. The practice that finds the house can secure it.

The thread through all of it does not change: collect widely, verify identity, grade every source, and say plainly what the evidence supports and what it does not.

Put it to work

  • Virtual CISO (intelligence-based information security, as needed or on retainer), 
  • Cyber risk and digital footprinting (SIGNAL, Am I a Target?, home-network and camera security)
  • Real estate (Property Intelligence Reports, solar site intelligence, executive-movement leads): PropertyFX.ai
  • Or go direct: jstutzman@monadnockcyber.ai · 1-888-299-6615

Tell me what you need to know. I’ll tell you what the evidence says.

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