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Ransomware: The Last Two Months Ransomware trends · 16 September to 16 November 2026

 

Monadnock Cyber
Ransomware: The Last Two Months
Ransomware trends · 16 September to 16 November 2026 · At the intersection of AI and Security
THE BOTTOM LINE

Ransomware crews listed more victims in the past month than in the month before (1,356 against 1,226) (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection). N0n and Silent Ransom Group at least doubled their listings (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection). Manufacturing, Professional Services and Technology were the most-listed industries (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection, ransomware.live).

WHAT IT MEANS

Ransomware leak sites list more victims than prior month. Ransomware and extortion crews listed 1,356 victims on their leak sites from 17 October to 16 November, more than the 1,226 they listed from 16 September to 16 October; these are the crews' own claims, not confirmed breaches (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection). Separately, organizations filed 412 breach notices with the state attorneys general we monitor from 17 October to 16 November, against 538 from 16 September to 16 October; registers post with different delays, so this is a floor, not a national total (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection). Our leak-site collection began on 26 August 2026, so we cannot compare these periods with earlier in the year (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection).

Leak-site listings per weekWeeks starting Monday; our collection began 26 August 202610020030013131 Aug14 Sep28 Sep35212 Oct26 Oct3109 NovSource: Monadnock Cyber collection (ransomware.live, ransomlook). Listings are the crews' own claims.

N0n led the crews that grew. N0n went from 105 to 217 listings, lifting its share of all listings from 9 to 16 percent; the chart shows each crew's share in each month (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection).

Share of leak-site listings by crewThe six most active crews over both months; everyone else is greyN0nThe GentlemenQilinINC RansomAkiraSilent Ransom GroupAll other crews16 September to 16 October1,226 listings9%11%8%64%17 October to 16 November1,356 listings16%9%9%55%Source: Monadnock Cyber collection (ransomware.live, ransomlook). Listings are the crews' own claims.

Manufacturing was the most-listed industry. Manufacturing (235), Professional Services (207) and Technology (179) were the most-listed industries, counting the 1,264 listings that ransomware.live assigns an industry (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection, ransomware.live). Retail & E-Commerce rose the most, from 32 to 58; Agriculture and Food Production fell the most, from 21 to 11 (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection, ransomware.live). For US organizations alone, the top three were Professional Services (99), Healthcare (92) and Manufacturing (72) (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection, ransomware.live).

Most-listed industries, month over monthListings with an industry assigned by ransomware.live16 September to 16 October17 October to 16 NovemberManufacturing118 → 117Professional Services98 → 109Technology85 → 94Healthcare85 → 89Retail & E-Commerce32 → 58Transportation56 → 30Financial Services37 → 44Education34 → 32Source: Monadnock Cyber collection; industry from ransomware.live. Listings are the crews' own claims.Which crews listed which industriesListings from 16 September to 16 November, top industriesManufacturingProfessionalServicesTechnologyHealthcareRetail &E-CommerceTransportationQilin39212591014N0n131216191035The Gentlemen1311131341Akira16143152INC Ransom7133632Emperador1243244Everest7855–2Source: Monadnock Cyber collection; industry from ransomware.live. Listings are the crews' own claims.
HOW THE CREWS OPERATE

N0n. We hold no MITRE ATT&CK profile for N0n; what we know comes from its leak-site listings (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection).

  • Industries it listed most, 16 September to 16 November: Transportation (35), Healthcare (19) and Technology (16), out of 127 listings with an industry and 322 in all (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection, ransomware.live).
  • US organizations: 119 of the 231 listings that name a country (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection, ransomware.live).

The Gentlemen. “The Gentlemen is a group that maintains the The Gentlemen Ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS).” (Source: MITRE ATT&CK G1058, updated 30 September 2026).

  • Industries it listed most, 16 September to 16 November: Technology (13), Manufacturing (13) and Healthcare (13), out of 73 listings with an industry and 256 in all (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection, ransomware.live).
  • US organizations: 29 of the 86 listings that name a country (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection, ransomware.live).
  • Gets in by: using stolen or legitimate accounts and exploiting flaws in internet-facing systems (Source: MITRE ATT&CK G1058).
  • Once inside: exploiting flaws to gain administrator rights, installing remote-management software and encrypting files (Source: MITRE ATT&CK G1058).
  • Tools: PsExec and Wevtutil (Source: MITRE ATT&CK G1058).

All 17 techniques MITRE ATT&CK documents for The Gentlemen, by stage. MITRE's page for the group, with its ATT&CK Navigator heat map: https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1058/ (Source: MITRE ATT&CK G1058)

StageTechnique (MITRE ID)
PreparingAcquire Infrastructure: Domains (T1583.001); Establish Accounts (T1585); Establish Accounts: Social Media Accounts (T1585.001); Obtain Capabilities: Tool (T1588.002); Generate Content: Written Content (T1683.001); Generate Content: Audio-Visual Content (T1683.002)
Getting inValid Accounts (T1078); Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190)
Gaining admin rightsExploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068)
HidingObfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing (T1027.002); Masquerading (T1036); Masquerading: Invalid Code Signature (T1036.001); Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location (T1036.005)
Mapping the networkRemote System Discovery (T1018)
Remote controlRemote Access Tools: Remote Desktop Software (T1219.002)
Damage and extortionData Encrypted for Impact (T1486); Financial Theft (T1657)

Qilin (MITRE tracks its operators as Water Galura). “Water Galura are the operators of the Qilin Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) who handle payload generation, ransom negotiations, and the publication of stolen data for Qilin affilates recruited on Russian cybercrime forums.” (Source: MITRE ATT&CK G1050, updated 31 July 2026).

  • Industries it listed most, 16 September to 16 November: Manufacturing (39), Technology (25) and Professional Services (21), out of 163 listings with an industry and 221 in all (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection, ransomware.live).
  • US organizations: 52 of the 198 listings that name a country (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection, ransomware.live).
  • Once inside: encrypting files (Source: MITRE ATT&CK G1050).
  • Tools: Tor (Source: MITRE ATT&CK G1050).

All 3 techniques MITRE ATT&CK documents for Qilin, by stage. MITRE's page for the group, with its ATT&CK Navigator heat map: https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1050/ (Source: MITRE ATT&CK G1050)

StageTechnique (MITRE ID)
PreparingEstablish Accounts: Social Media Accounts (T1585.001)
Damage and extortionData Encrypted for Impact (T1486); Financial Theft (T1657)

INC Ransom. “INC Ransom is a ransomware and data extortion threat group associated with the deployment of INC Ransomware that has been active since at least July 2023.” (Source: MITRE ATT&CK G1032, updated 31 July 2026).

  • Industries it listed most, 16 September to 16 November: Professional Services (13), Manufacturing (7) and Healthcare (6), out of 46 listings with an industry and 115 in all (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection, ransomware.live).
  • US organizations: 32 of the 56 listings that name a country (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection, ransomware.live).
  • MITRE on its targets: “INC Ransom has targeted organizations worldwide most commonly in the industrial, healthcare, and education sectors in the US and Europe.” (Source: MITRE ATT&CK G1032).
  • Gets in by: using stolen or legitimate accounts, exploiting flaws in internet-facing systems and phishing email (Source: MITRE ATT&CK G1032).
  • Once inside: moving between machines over Remote Desktop, installing remote-management software, encrypting files and copying data out to cloud accounts (Source: MITRE ATT&CK G1032).
  • Tools: PsExec, Net, Tor, Nltest, esentutl, AdFind and Rclone (Source: MITRE ATT&CK G1032).

All 25 techniques MITRE ATT&CK documents for INC Ransom, by stage. MITRE's page for the group, with its ATT&CK Navigator heat map: https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1032/ (Source: MITRE ATT&CK G1032)

StageTechnique (MITRE ID)
PreparingObtain Capabilities: Tool (T1588.002)
Getting inValid Accounts (T1078); Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190); Phishing (T1566)
Running codeWindows Management Instrumentation (T1047); Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell (T1059.003); System Services: Service Execution (T1569.002)
HidingMasquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location (T1036.005); Indicator Removal: File Deletion (T1070.004)
Switching off defensesDisable or Modify Tools (T1685)
Mapping the networkNetwork Service Discovery (T1046); System Network Connections Discovery (T1049); Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups (T1069.002); Account Discovery: Domain Account (T1087.002); Network Share Discovery (T1135)
Moving between machinesRemote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001); Lateral Tool Transfer (T1570)
Gathering dataData Staged (T1074); Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility (T1560.001)
Remote controlApplication Layer Protocol (T1071); Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105); Remote Access Tools (T1219)
Taking data outTransfer Data to Cloud Account (T1537)
Damage and extortionData Encrypted for Impact (T1486); Financial Theft (T1657)

Akira. “Akira is a ransomware variant and ransomware deployment entity active since at least March 2023.” (Source: MITRE ATT&CK G1024, updated 31 July 2026).

  • Industries it listed most, 16 September to 16 November: Manufacturing (16), Professional Services (14) and Retail & E-Commerce (5), out of 51 listings with an industry and 76 in all (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection, ransomware.live).
  • US organizations: 17 of the 33 listings that name a country (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection, ransomware.live).
  • MITRE on its targets: “Technical analysis of Akira ransomware indicates variants capable of targeting Windows or VMWare ESXi hypervisors and multiple overlaps with Conti ransomware.” (Source: MITRE ATT&CK G1024).
  • Gets in by: using stolen or legitimate accounts and logging in through VPNs and other remote-access services (Source: MITRE ATT&CK G1024).
  • Once inside: moving between machines over Remote Desktop, installing remote-management software, encrypting files, stealing Windows login tickets and copying data out to cloud storage (Source: MITRE ATT&CK G1024).
  • Tools: Mimikatz, PsExec, LaZagne, AdFind and Rclone (Source: MITRE ATT&CK G1024).

All 17 techniques MITRE ATT&CK documents for Akira, by stage. MITRE's page for the group, with its ATT&CK Navigator heat map: https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024/ (Source: MITRE ATT&CK G1024)

StageTechnique (MITRE ID)
Getting inValid Accounts (T1078); External Remote Services (T1133)
Running codeCommand and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001)
HidingObfuscated Files or Information: Binary Padding (T1027.001); Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location (T1036.005)
Switching off defensesDisable or Modify Tools (T1685)
Stealing passwordsSteal or Forge Kerberos Tickets (T1558)
Mapping the networkRemote System Discovery (T1018); Domain Trust Discovery (T1482)
Moving between machinesRemote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001)
Gathering dataData from Information Repositories: Sharepoint (T1213.002); Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility (T1560.001)
Remote controlRemote Access Tools (T1219)
Taking data outExfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (T1567.002)
Damage and extortionData Encrypted for Impact (T1486); Account Access Removal (T1531); Financial Theft (T1657)

Silent Ransom Group. We hold no MITRE ATT&CK profile for Silent Ransom Group; what we know comes from its leak-site listings (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection).

  • Industries it listed most, 16 September to 16 November: Professional Services (25), out of 25 listings with an industry and 55 in all (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection, ransomware.live).
  • US organizations: 18 of the 19 listings that name a country (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection, ransomware.live).
What to do about it

What the crews have in common

The six most active crews posted 1,045 of the 2,582 leak-site listings from 16 September to 16 November (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection). MITRE ATT&CK documents four of them: The Gentlemen, Qilin, INC Ransom and Akira. Their methods overlap, with the same few ways in and the same Windows tools once inside, so blocking those shared steps works against all four (Source: MITRE ATT&CK G1058, G1050, G1032, G1024).

StageWhat MITRE documents, by crewWhat stops it (Monadnock Cyber recommendation)
Getting inSigning in with stolen or legitimate accounts (The Gentlemen, INC Ransom, Akira), including through VPNs and other remote-access services (Akira). Exploiting flaws in internet-facing systems (The Gentlemen, INC Ransom). Phishing email (INC Ransom).Phishing-resistant multi-factor sign-in on every remote-access service. Fast patching of internet-facing systems.
Mapping the network and stealing passwordsDirectory lookup tools AdFind (INC Ransom, Akira), Nltest and Net (INC Ransom). Password-theft tools Mimikatz and LaZagne, and theft of Windows login tickets (Akira).Windows Credential Guard. Limits on who can query the directory. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) software set to block, not only alert.
Moving between machinesRemote Desktop (INC Ransom, Akira). PsExec (The Gentlemen, INC Ransom, Akira). Remote-management software (The Gentlemen, INC Ransom, Akira).Remote Desktop switched off where it is not needed. Network segmentation. An approved list of remote-management tools.
Hiding and taking dataWevtutil, a Windows tool that can clear event logs (The Gentlemen). Rclone (INC Ransom, Akira) and copying data out to cloud storage or cloud accounts (INC Ransom, Akira). Tor (INC Ransom, Qilin).Logs copied to a central store attackers cannot edit. Outbound firewall rules that block unapproved cloud sync and Tor.
Encryption and extortionEncrypting files (all four).Backups that cannot be changed or deleted, with one copy offline.

Source for the middle column: MITRE ATT&CK group pages G1058, G1050, G1032, G1024.

  • Everyday tools, not exotic malware. Most of the tools above ship with Windows or are tools IT teams use daily, such as PsExec, Nltest, esentutl, Rclone and remote-management software (Source: MITRE ATT&CK G1058, G1032, G1024). Security software that looks only for known malicious files will not flag a legitimate program, so watch for these tools running where your IT team does not use them (Monadnock Cyber recommendation).
  • Two crews we cannot profile. MITRE ATT&CK has no profile for N0n or Silent Ransom Group, so we cannot say how they get in. Silent Ransom Group listed only professional-services firms: all 25 of its listings with an industry (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection, ransomware.live).
  • Where the victims are. US organizations made up half or more of the listings that name a country for N0n (119 of 231), INC Ransom (32 of 56), Akira (17 of 33) and Silent Ransom Group (18 of 19). For Qilin the figure was 52 of 198, and for The Gentlemen 29 of 86 (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection, ransomware.live).

What to do now

These steps follow the methods in the table, ordered by how much risk each removes for the effort (Monadnock Cyber recommendation).

  1. First week: close the ways in.
    • Turn on phishing-resistant multi-factor sign-in for VPNs, remote-desktop gateways, webmail and cloud accounts. MITRE documents Akira signing in through VPNs and other remote-access services with stolen or legitimate accounts (Source: MITRE ATT&CK G1024).
    • List every internet-facing firewall, VPN, load balancer and file-transfer server, and apply critical fixes within 48 hours of release.
    • Make sure Remote Desktop (TCP port 3389) is never open directly to the internet.
  2. Second week: protect your way back.
    • Make sure backups cannot be changed or deleted, even by a stolen domain administrator account. Use write-once (object-lock) storage or a copy kept offline.
    • Restore one critical server in full from backup. Until you have done that, you do not know the backup works.
  3. Weeks three and four: slow them down inside.
    • List the remote-management tools your IT team uses and block the rest. Block Rclone and unapproved cloud-storage sites at the web proxy.
    • Give IT staff separate administrator accounts, and keep those accounts off email and the web.
  4. After the first month: prepare for the bad day.
    • Put an incident-response firm and breach counsel on retainer before you need them.
    • Print the emergency contact list and the recovery plan. If Active Directory and your chat system go down, the online copies go with them.

If you have been hit

Take these steps in order (Monadnock Cyber recommendation).

  1. Contain it.
    • Disconnect affected machines from the network: unplug the cable, turn off Wi-Fi, or isolate them with your EDR tool. Do not reboot or rebuild them yet, because a reboot erases the evidence held in memory.
    • Cut site-to-site VPNs, vendor connections and outbound internet from server networks to stop data leaving.
    • Assume the attackers can read company email and chat, and run the response over personal phones or a separate conference line.
  2. Protect backups and evidence.
    • Cut network access to backup systems so the attackers cannot encrypt or wipe them.
    • Save firewall, VPN, sign-in and EDR logs before they roll over. MITRE lists Wevtutil, which can clear Windows event logs, among The Gentlemen's tools (Source: MITRE ATT&CK G1058).
  3. Call for help.
    • Call your cyber insurer's breach line or outside breach counsel. Ask counsel whether to bring in the incident-response firm through them, to keep its findings under attorney-client privilege.
  4. Make your accounts trustworthy before you restore.
    • Do not restore servers onto a network the attackers still control. First reset every Active Directory password, including the KRBTGT account password twice to cancel stolen login tickets. Then revoke cloud sign-in sessions and rebuild domain controllers from clean media.
  5. Assume data was taken.
    • All six crews publish stolen data on leak sites (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection). Have the response team check outbound firewall and proxy logs for large transfers, so counsel can work out who must be notified.
THE EVIDENCE
  • Leak-site listings, all sources: 1,226 (16 September to 16 October), 1,356 (17 October to 16 November). (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection — ransomware.live, ransomlook)
  • State attorney-general breach notices: 538 (16 September to 16 October), 412 (17 October to 16 November). (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection)
  • N0n: 105 → 217 listings. (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection)
  • The Gentlemen: 133 → 123 listings. (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection)
  • Qilin: 94 → 127 listings. (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection)
  • INC Ransom: 47 → 68 listings. (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection)
  • Akira: 39 → 37 listings. (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection)
  • Silent Ransom Group: 18 → 37 listings. (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection)
  • N0n: 105 → 217 listings. (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection)
  • Silent Ransom Group: 18 → 37 listings. (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection)
  • LeakedData: 16 → 33 listings. (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection)
  • Booba Project: 12 → 32 listings. (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection)
  • US share of listings that name a country: 36 percent (16 September to 16 October), 47 percent (17 October to 16 November). (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection, ransomware.live)
  • Manufacturing: Qilin posted the most listings, 39 of 235. (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection, ransomware.live)
  • Professional Services: Silent Ransom Group posted the most listings, 25 of 207. (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection, ransomware.live)
  • Technology: Qilin posted the most listings, 25 of 179. (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection, ransomware.live)
  • Largest single-day posts: N0n, 46 listings on 9 November; crews post in batches, so weekly counts swing on a few posting days. (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection)
  • Largest single-day posts: INC Ransom, 42 listings on 10 November; crews post in batches, so weekly counts swing on a few posting days. (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection)
  • Largest single-day posts: The Gentlemen, 38 listings on 26 October; crews post in batches, so weekly counts swing on a few posting days. (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection)
  • KillSec: no listings recorded after 27 September (46 in the first period); we cannot tell whether the crew stopped posting or its site dropped out of our sources. (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection)
  • WhiteArmor: 27 listings in the second period, none in the first. (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection)
  • PixelLeaks: 26 listings in the second period, none in the first. (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection)
  • Soul: 26 listings in the second period, none in the first. (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection)
  • The Gentlemen: MITRE ATT&CK group G1058 (The Gentlemen). (Source: MITRE ATT&CK — https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1058)
  • Qilin: MITRE ATT&CK group G1050 (Water Galura). (Source: MITRE ATT&CK — https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1050)
  • INC Ransom: MITRE ATT&CK group G1032 (INC Ransom). (Source: MITRE ATT&CK — https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1032)
  • Akira: MITRE ATT&CK group G1024 (Akira). (Source: MITRE ATT&CK — https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024)
  • Manufacturing: 118 → 117 listings. (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection, ransomware.live — https://www.ransomware.live)
  • Professional Services: 98 → 109 listings. (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection, ransomware.live — https://www.ransomware.live)
  • Technology: 85 → 94 listings. (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection, ransomware.live — https://www.ransomware.live)
  • Healthcare: 85 → 89 listings. (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection, ransomware.live — https://www.ransomware.live)
  • Retail & E-Commerce: 32 → 58 listings. (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection, ransomware.live — https://www.ransomware.live)
  • Transportation: 56 → 30 listings. (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection, ransomware.live — https://www.ransomware.live)
  • Financial Services: 37 → 44 listings. (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection, ransomware.live — https://www.ransomware.live)
  • Education: 34 → 32 listings. (Source: Monadnock Cyber collection, ransomware.live — https://www.ransomware.live)
✓ Prepared on Monadnock infrastructure. Authored by the local engine rules (feature/ransomware_trends.py); headlines: qwen3.6:latest and cross-checked by local engines (rules_brief.valid, ICD-203 gate, protected-data check, TLP:CLEAR victim-name check); ICD-203 lexicon enforced by a deterministic gate (CLEAN). The 'What to do about it' section was drafted with Google Gemini and edited by Claude (Anthropic) at the analyst's direction; every fact in it is checked against MITRE ATT&CK or our collection. Statistics carry their sources inline.
Monadnock Cyber LLC · At the intersection of AI and Security
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